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INTRODUCTION
This Article reports an attempt to investigate empirically
important aspects of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court. In
the course of doing so, it touches upon two other topics. Most
directly, it addresses the appropriate scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Less directly, it raises questions about the role that empiri-
cal research should play in fashioning constitutional rules.
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and sei-
zures be reasonable, and that warrants authorizing searches or
seizures be based on probable cause.' Central to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of this language is the phrase "reasonable
expectations of privacy." First appearing in Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion in Katz v. United States,2 this rubric has since
been adopted by a majority of the Court to serve at least three
major purposes.
1. In relevant part, the Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects places where "a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy").
3. A fourth purpose that "reasonable expectations of privacy" analysis might serve,
not discussed here, is determining when a "third party" may validly consent to a search
of property. Although it has not expressly used "reasonable expectations of privacy" lan-
guage in this context, the Supreme Court has used language that resonates with the
concept, stating that when two people have "joint access or control" over property "for
most purposes," either may consent to a search of it. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 171 n.7 (1974). At the same time, because the Court has indicated that a third-party
consent will be valid whenever an officer reasonably believes such joint access or control
exists, see Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990), this area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is not as amenable to the type of research reported in this
Article, as should become clear below. See infra text accompanying notes 23-28, 68.
HeinOnline  -- 42 Duke L.J.  728 1992-1993
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
Most important, it is used to define the word "search" in the
Fourth Amendment. An action by law enforcement officers that
does not infringe on "reasonable expectations of privacy" is not a
"search," and therefore need not be authorized by a warrant, or
be based on probable cause, or be in any other way "reasonable."
Using this rationale, the Court has held that rummaging through
garbage,' trespassing on private property beyond the curtilage of
the home,' flying airplanes and helicopters over backyards,6 using
undercover agents,7 subpoenaing bank records,. and a host of
other investigative activities9 are not regulated by the Fourth
Amendment.
The phrase is also found, usually with the word "legitimate"
replacing the word "reasonable," in the Court's Fourth Amend-
ment standing cases, which address when a police action is a
"search" with respect to a particular person. Only a person whose
own "legitimate" expectations of privacy have been violated may
invoke the "exclusionary rule,"' the sanction the Court has de-
veloped for deterring Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, for
instance, a defendant may not be able to suppress items found
during a search of a car in which he is merely a one-time passen-
ger.'2
The "expectations of privacy" concept is important to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in a third way. Even if particular police
conduct infringes on privacy to the extent necessary to constitute a
"search" the defendant has standing to contest, it may not be
subject to the "usual" warrant and probable cause requirements if
it is thought to invade relatively less significant privacy interests.
The Court has held, for instance, that mobile vehicles may be
4. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
5. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
6. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (helicopter); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (airplane).
7. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
8. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (search of jail cell);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979) (obtaining list of phone numbers from
phone company).
10. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
11. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
12. These are the facts of Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49, where the Court held that a
"passenger qua passenger" will rarely have an expectation of privacy recognized by the
Fourth Amendment.
7291993]
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searched without a warrant, in part because there are "reduced
expectations of privacy" in such vehicles.13 Further, the Court has
permitted warrantless, suspicionless, drug and alcohol testing of
railway employees, in part on the ground that "the expectations of
privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their
participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure
safety.,14 A number of other Court decisions have relied on a
finding of lowered privacy expectations in sanctioning searches in
the absence of a warrant and probable cause."5
The Fourth Amendment is meant to regulate "seizures" of
persons as well as searches for things. Given the infringement on
"locomotion" involved in a seizure,16 one might more accurately
characterize the concern here in terms of reasonable expectations
of "autonomy" rather than of "privacy." Although the Court has
not used either phrase in defining seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court's language invokes the autonomy concept.
Consider, for instance, the Court's first attempt to define seizures
of persons outside the context of arrest, which came a year after
Katz, in Terry v. Ohio.7 There the Court stated that a seizure
occurs "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and re-
strains his freedom to walk away."1" Subsequently, the Court var-
iously characterized a seizure as occurring when "a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave"1 9 or
when "a reasonable person ... was not at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about his business."2 Its most recent pro-
13. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
14. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
15. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (quoting Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)) (warrant and probable cause not required in a
search involving a public employee's workplace, desk, and files, in part because "the
employer intrusions at issue here 'involve a relatively limited invasion' of employee priva-
cy"); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) ("When a [gun] dealer chooses
to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does
so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject
to effective inspection."); Camara, 387 U.S. at 537 (residential safety inspections "involve
a relatively limited invasion").
16. See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L REv. 1258, 1328-30 (1990) (discussing the
Supreme Court's mistaken emphasis on privacy interests).
17. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. Id. at 16.
19. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
20. Michigan v. Chestermut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988).
[Vol. 42:727
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nouncement on the autonomy concept came in Florida v.
Bostick,21 where it stated that police confrontation implicates the
Fourth Amendment only when it has communicated to a reason-
able person that the person is not "free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."'
For the most part, the Court has been content with fleshing
out the meaning of the phrases "reasonable expectations of priva-
cy" and "reasonable feelings of restraint" through their application
to specific cases. But the Court has also provided two significant
guidelines as to how these phrases should be interpreted. The first
guideline came in Rakas v. IllinoisI3 where the majority opinion,
by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, stated that "[1]egitimation of
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society. '  Most important for present purposes
is the last clause of this excerpt, which indicates the Court's will-
ingness to rely on societal understandings in defining "reasonable
expectations of privacy." Although this language appeared in a
footnote, and was directed solely toward defining the standing
concept, it has since been relied upon in the text of several other
cases involving the "search" issue, often rephrased in terms of
expectations of privacy "society is prepared to recognize as 'rea-
sonable.' ""
The second guideline came from the same footnote in Rakas.
According to the Court, the use of the word "legitimate" or "rea-
sonable" before "expectations of privacy" is meant to convey
"more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered."'26
As the Court explained,
21. Ill S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
22. Id. at 2389.
23. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
24. Id. at 144 n.12.
25. The latter language actually first appeared in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), but was not
picked up until cases following Rakas. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
39-40 (1988) (searches of garbage); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)
(overflights of backyards); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (search of
package).
26. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
1993]
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[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off
season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of
privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as "legiti-
mate." His presence ... is "wrongful"; his expectation is not
"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ""
In short, the Fourth Amendment does not protect expectations of
privacy that only a criminal would have.
The Court's seizure cases also reflect these guidelines. While
they do not rely on community values as explicitly as the search
cases do, their repeated use of the "reasonable person" rubric
suggests a similar reliance on what the average citizen would feel
with respect to restraints on freedom of action. And the notion
that the Fourth Amendment threshold is to be determined from
the viewpoint of the non-criminal has been firmly endorsed. In
Florida v. Bostick, the majority stated that "the 'reasonable
person' test [adopted in that case with respect to seizures] presup-
poses an innocent person."2
Accordingly, if one takes the Justices at their word, a sense of
how (innocent) U.S. citizens gauge the impact of police investiga-
tive techniques on their privacy and autonomy is highly relevant to
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This Article describes
an effort to obtain some preliminary data in this regard. We con-
ducted a survey of 217 individuals to ascertain their understanding
of the interests implicated by various types of police investigative
techniques. Although tentative, the results strofigly suggest that
some of the Court's decisions regarding the threshold of the
Fourth Amendment and the warrant and probable cause require-
ments do not reflect societal understandings. Indeed, some of the
Court's conclusions in this regard may be well off the mark.
A second goal of our research was to reach some understand-
ing of the types of factors people consider in evaluating the intru-
siveness of a search or seizure. Based on our results, we develop
three theories of intrusiveness. These theories suggest that there
are institutional reasons why judges might tend to underestimate
the privacy and autonomy interests infringed on by police actions,
a tendency that might be counteracted by empirical research of the
type described here.
27. Id. at 143-44 n.12 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, ., concurring)).
28. 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991).
[Vol. 42:727




Given the goals described above, we set out to obtain infor-
mation about how people react to various types of investigations
undertaken by the police. With respect to searches, we wanted to
discover their expectations of privacy in the searched area. With
respect to seizures, we wanted to discern the extent to which they
felt restrained by the police action. More succinctly, we were in-
terested in how society perceives the "intrusiveness" of govern-
ment investigative methods. Using the single word "intrusiveness"
is less cumbersome than speaking about the impact of government
conduct on reasonable expectations of privacy or the extent to
which one feels free to terminate an encounter with the police. At
the same time, "intrusiveness" captures the core of the construct
we sought to investigate, as evidenced by the Court's reliance on
the word-in both search cases and seizure cases--when referring
to Fourth Amendment interests. 29
We developed four working hypotheses. Based on previous
findings concerning judicial misperceptions about privacy in the
related area of consent searches,' our first hypothesis was that
many of the Court's conclusions about expectations of privacy and
autonomy do not correlate with actual understandings of innocent-
29. With respect to searches, see, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1990)
("Nor do we here suggest, as the State does, that entering rooms not examined prior to
the arrest is a de minimis intrusion that may be disregarded."); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984) ("The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual choos-
es to conceal assertedly 'private' activity [but instead is] whether the government's intru-
sion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment"); accord United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) ("With the footlocker
safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion
of a search without a warrant."); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (stating,
with respect to a search of a car and its seizure, that "which is the 'greater' and which
the 'lesser' intrusion is itself a debatable question"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 769-70 (1966) (holding that "searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface"
are protected by the Fourth Amendment); see also supra note 15.
With respect to seizures, see, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 451-53 (1990) (discussing "minimal intrusion" of sobriety checkpoints); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (discussing "minimal intrusion" of immigrant
checkpoints); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(arguing that arrest is "a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person
seized is guilty or innocent").
30. See Dorothy K. Kagehiro et al., Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Third-
Party Consent Searches, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1991).
7331993]
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members of society (Hypothesis 1). We expected to find, for in-
stance, that most people maintain a strong expectation of privacy
in information given to a bank, contrary to the Court's holding in
United States v. Miller3 that one assumes the risk that such infor-
mation will be disclosed to the government.32
In anticipation of finding this first hypothesis valid, our re-
maining three hypotheses focused on why societal perceptions of
intrusiveness might be underestimated by the judiciary. The first
hypothesis on this score was that searches or seizures of one's own
property or person are perceived as more intrusive than those of
others (Hypothesis 2). If so, the judges, whose cases invariably
involve police actions that happen to other people, might under-
value the intrusiveness of searches and seizures, at least as per-
ceived by those members of society who have experienced them or
something similar to them.
We also conjectured that a search or seizure with a specified
objective (for. example, a stop on the street to frisk for drugs) is
viewed as less intrusive than an investigative action with no clear
aim (for example, a stop on the street), because the former action
seems more "justified" (Hypothesis 3). If so, the courts-which
usually evaluate a search and seizure only if it has met its objec-
tive-may again systematically underestimate the intrusiveness of
various police actions, at least as gauged by the "innocent" person
the Supreme Court tells us to assume. Most directly, the courts
may tend to undervalue the innocent person's sense of invasion in
those cases in which the police do not explain themselves.33 Even
31. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
32. Id. at 443.
33. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (officers approached Brown and
asked him to identify himself and state what he was doing in the area, without explain-
iag their suspicions); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (without explaining his actions,
officer approached Terry and two others, asked their names and, when they "mumbled
something," grabbed Terry, spun him around so that he was facing the other two, and
patted down the outside of his clothing); cf Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991)
(tWo uniformed, armed officers confronted Bostick on a bus and asked to inspect his
ticket and identification, before explaining that they were looking for illegal drugs). The
lack of communication between officers and targets is exacerbated by the Supreme
Court's willingness to sanction pretextual searches. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (government officials ' boarded sailboat ostensibly to check
documents but in fact to look for evidence of drug smuggling). Even searches based on
warrants which, if read by the target of the search, should provide notice as to the
government's objective, can be misleading. Cf Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)
(warrant need not list all items for which police have probable cause or reasonable suspi-
[Vol. 42:727
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in those cases in which a target knows the police objective, the
courts' evaluation is likely to be tainted by their further knowledge
that the objective was achieved (for example, the drugs were
found);- obviously, such knowledge does not facilitate under-
standing of the innocent person's perspective.
A final hypothesis had to do with the relationship between
perceptions of intrusiveness and attitudes toward the criminal
justice system, the latter as conceptualized by Professor Herbert
Packer. Packer described two perspectives on the criminal process:
the crime control model, which is based on the proposition that
repression of criminal conduct is the overriding objective of the
criminal justice system, and the due process model, which insists
on the protection of the liberty and due process rights of suspects
and criminals even at the cost of freeing the guilty.35 The hypoth-
esis in connection with these models was that intrusiveness rank-
ings are directly related to due process attitudes and inversely
related to crime control attitudes (Hypothesis 4). If so, the current
Court, which is decidedly crime control-oriented, 36 predictably
would opt for less generous assessments of intrusiveness.
B. Materials and Administration
As the first step toward testing these hypotheses, we devel-
oped the Intrusiveness Rating Scale, which depicts in abbreviated
form fifty different search and seizure scenarios derived primarily
from Supreme Court or lower court cases. To provide additional
information relevant to Hypotheses 2 and 3, each scenario was
varied according to Person (First and Third) and Evidence (No or
Yes). In the First Person condition, the description of the scenario
was phrased as if the survey participant were the target of the
search or seizure. In the Third Person condition, it was implied
that another person was being searched. The No Evidence condi-
cion).
34. This knowledge results, of course, from the fact that search and seizure issues
are typically raised in the context of a criminal prosecution, through a suppression mo-
tion which attempts to exclude evidence discovered by the police. See generally CHARLES
H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.01 (3d ed.
1993).
35. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
5-23 (1964).
36. See eg., Geoffrey R. Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive Majoritar-
ianism: A Court in Transition, 19 GA. L. REV. 15 (1984).
19931
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tion did not specify any particular goal of the search, whereas the
Yes Evidence condition described the specific evidence being
sought or crime being investigated. A 2 x 2 factorial design pro-
duced the following four groups of variations: (1) First Person/No
Evidence present (for example, "A search of your garbage can");
(2) Third Person/No Evidence (for example, "A search of a gar-
bage can"); (3) First Person/Evidence (for example, "A search of
your garbage can for evidence of forgery"); and (4) Third Per-
son/Evidence (for example, "A search of a garbage can for evi-
dence of forgery").
Each subject received a form describing the fifty scenarios,
consistently using one of the four variations described above. The
participants were asked to assume, as dictated by the Supreme
Court's caselaw, 7 that the person who was searched or seized (or
who possessed the property being searched or seized) was inno-
cent. In addition, they were asked to assume that the search or
seizure was conducted by government agents and that it was
nonconsensual. They were then requested to rate, on a scale of 0
to 100, the extent to which they considered each method "an
invasion of privacy or autonomy," with 0 representing "Not At All
Intrusive" and 100 representing "Extremely Intrusive." It would
have been consistent with these instructions to rate each of the
scenarios at "0" or at "100," although we expected to find wide
variations between scenarios.
To test Hypothesis 4, attitudes toward crime control were
measured by the Attitudes Toward Crime Control Scales earlier
developed by Professor Schumacher." The Scales consist of twen-
ty-two items (for example, "The presumption of guilt is necessary
to control crime"), which subjects were asked to rate on a seven-
point anchored scale from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly
Agree")." The responses on these scales were then compared to
the responses on the Intrusiveness Rating Scale.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
38. Joseph E. Schumacher, Measuring Attitudes Toward Crime Control: The Atti-
tudes Toward Crime Control Scales, Paper Presented at the American Psychological As-
sociation Annual Conference (Aug. 1991).
39. The Scales have been found to be reliable (with internal consistency coefficients
of r = .73 (see infra note 128 for an explanation of this figure)). They are also valid
measures of crime control and due process attitude constructs, as related to authoritarian-
ism, predictions of recidivism, and differential tolerance of errors in judicial decisions. Id.
[Vol. 42:727
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C. 'Subjects
Four groups of subjects (N = 217) were recruited on a volun-
tary basis to complete the Intrusiveness Rating Scale and the Atti-
tudes Toward Crime Control Scales: (1) undergraduate students
just beginning a University of Southern California course in law
and society (n = 79); (2) University of Florida law students who
had not yet taken a course in criminal procedure (n = 52); (3)
citizens from the general community in Gainesville, Florida (n =
25); and (4) Australian law students from Monash University, in
Melbourne (n = 61). The sample consisted of approximately half
males and half females, primarily of the Caucasian race (with a
larger number of Hispanics, Latinos, and Asians in the USC sam-
ple). It ranged in age from eighteen to seventy (average age =
twenty-four), with an average education at the sophomore college
level.
H. TESTING HYPOTHESIS 1: INTRUSIVENESS RANKINGS
A. Results
Table 1 presents the scenarios in the Intrusiveness Rating
Scale, each ranked (henceforth designated by "R") according to
the mean obtained by averaging the intrusiveness ratings from all
217 subjects across all four conditions. On this scale, the least
intrusive search and seizure scenario was a search of foliage in a
park (R = 1), and the most intrusive was a body cavity search at
the international border (R = 50). Table 1 also provides the mean
intrusiveness rating (henceforth designated by "M") and the stan-
dard deviation for each scenario (henceforth designated by
"S.D.").
19931
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TABLE 1
INTRUSIVENESS RANKINGS AND MEANS OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE SCENARIOS
R Scenario M S.D.
1. Looking in foliage in public park 6.48 15.74
2. Going through magnetometer at airport 13.47 18.74
3. Shining flashlight down dark alley next to home 18.33 25.64
4. Inspecting exterior of car in public lot 19A6 21.98
5. Looking through burned-down house 30.26 30.85
6. Searching jail cell 30.63 27.87
7. Inspecting kitchen of restaurant 31.14 28.15
8. Following pedestrian in police car 32.73 39.85
9. Stopping all drivers at roadblock to view occupants 37.06 29.55
10. Flying 400 yards above backyard in helicopter 40.32 30.44
11. Inspecting plumbing and wiring of residence 42.51 30.25
12. Pat-down at border 42.76 38.70
13. Going through garbage in opaque bags at curbside 44.95 30.85
14. Stopping drivers at roadblock for 46.41 31.19
30-second questioning at night
15. Obtaining a voiceprint 48.21 31.74
16. Searching a coal mine 52.17 35.35
17. Searching a private junkyard 54.15 29.04
18. Using a beeper to track car 54A6 36.14
19. Pat-down 54.76 31.84
20. Search of newspaper office 56.31 31.42
21. Search of cornfields surrounded 56.58 28.99
by fence and "No Trespassing" signs
22. Fingerprinting in back of police car 57.39 31.11
23. Dog sniff of body 58.33 31.58
24. Searching bedroom of probationer 59.85 30.27
25. Searching a sixth-grader's locker 60.32 28.26
26. Rummaging through suitcase at airport 60.93 27.72
27. Going through drawers at office 63.11 27.43
28. Arrest, handcuffing, and detention for 48 hours 65.58 24.84
29. Looking in trunk of car on public street 67.20 31.77
30. Searching interior of car on public highway 67.53 26.33
31. Using chauffeur as undercover agent 67.56 24.82
32. Searching footlocker found in car 67.91 28.47
33. Watching person in front yard with binoculars 68.63 24.34
34. Using secretary as undercover agent 68.98 32.32
35. Searching yacht at sea 69.11 24.75
36. Questioning on public sidewalk for 10 minutes 69.45 33.16
37. Searching a garage 71.20 22.41
38. Perusing bank records 71.60 24.81
39. Accompanying to urinal at work and 72.49 26.43
listening for sounds of urination
HeinOnline  -- 42 Duke L.J.  738 1992-1993
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
Rank Scenario Mean S.D.
40. Hospital surgery on shoulder 74.17 30.06
41. Searching high school student's purse 75.14 37.90
42. Tapping into corporation's computer 75.21 22.78
43. Search of college dormitory room 76.13 24.52
44. Boarding a bus and asking to search luggage 77.22 23.66
45. Searching mobile home 77.68 21.04
46. Needle in arm at work to get blood 84.94 22.19
47. Search of a bedroom 85.23 18.45
48. Reading a personal diary 85.56 20.73
49. Monitoring phone for 30 days 87.67 19.00
50. Body cavity search at border 90.14 18.18
The overall rankings for many of the scenarios conform in a
broad way with the Supreme Court's holdings. For instance, hospi-
tal surgery on a shoulder (R = 40), a search of a bedroom (R =
47), and bugging a phone (R = 49) are seen as very intrusive
searches, as the Court's cases suggest they should be.4 At the
other end of the scale, searches of jail cells (R -- 6), flying over
backyards (R = 10), and going through garbage (R = 13) are
viewed as relatively unintrusive, again in conformity with the
Court's decisions.41 In between are searches of cars (R = 29, 30)
and of luggage in cars (R = 32), as the Court's caselaw would
predict.' In the seizure domain, a ten-minute stop is seen as fair-
ly intrusive (R = 36), whereas being followed by a police car (R =
40. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759-63 (1985) (surgery in shoulder to find
bullet requires probable cause, a finding that surgery does not threaten safety or health
of individual, and a finding that it does not unnecessarily impinge on the "individual's
dignitary interests"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-65 (1969) (search of house
normally requires warrant based on probable cause, in the absence of exigency); Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) (phone tap requires warrant based on probable
cause particularly describing offense involved and communications to be intercepted and
limiting duration of tap).
41. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (investigation of jail cell not a
search); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (helicopter overflight not a search); Califor-
nia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (going through garbage not a search).
42. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1985) (vehicle searches implicate
Fourth Amendment and require probable cause, but do not require warrant, in part be-
cause vehicles are associated with lesser expectation of privacy); California v. Acevedo,
111 S. Ct. 1982, 1989 (1991) (container placed in car associated with lesser expectation of
privacy, no warrant required).
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8) and being stopped at a. nighttime roadblock (R = 14) are not,
all in rough congruence with Court decisions.43
Of at least equal interest, however, is the apparent disagree-
ment with other Court holdings concerning the extent to which
particular types of investigative actions implicate privacy or auton-
omy interests. For instance, the Court has held that police use of
undercover agents to obtain information does not violate "justifi-
able expectations of privacy," because one assumes the risk that
one's acquaintances will reveal confidences.' The survey partici-
pants, in contrast, found various types of undercover activity, in-
cluding covert use of a chauffeur (R = 31) and a secretary (R =
34), to be very intrusive, at least as invasive as, for instance,
searches of cars (R = 29, 30). Along the same lines, whereas Unit-
ed States v. Millet" held that a bank depositor "takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be con-
veyed by that person to the Government," 6 the scenario involv-
ing government perusal of bank records received a high ranking
(R = 38) and mean score (M = 71.60).
The Court has also held that police entry onto fenced-in pri-
vate property outside the curtilage of the home is not a search, 47
and has strongly suggested that a "dog sriff" of a person does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment.' Yet both of these police ac-
tions received fairly high rankings (R = 21 and R = 23, respective-
ly) and mean scores (M = 56.58 and M = 58.33, respectively). In-
43. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (investigative stop not as intrusive as an
arrest but still a seizure); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (following a pedes-
trian in police car not a seizure); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990) (sobriety checkpoint conducted at night a seizure, but only minimally intrusive).
44. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
45. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
46. Id. at 443.
47. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
48. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707-08 (1983). Arguably, the Court's lan-
guage concerning the Fourth Amendment's application to dog sniffs was dictum, as the
Court subsequently decided that the seizure permitting the dog sniff was unconstitutional.
Id. at 709. Lower courts, however, have not treated it as such. See e-g., United States v.
Colyer, 878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Court's rationale for finding that canine sniffs
of luggage are not searches could easily be applied to sniffs of persons. The Court noted
that the sniff (1) "does not require opening the luggage"; (2) "does not expose noncon-
traband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view"; (3) "discloses only
the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item"; and (4) "ensures that the own-
er of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in
less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods." Place, 462 US. at 707.
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deed, both are ranked at the same general level as a "frisk" (R =
19, M = 54.76), which, according to the Court, is a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes, albeit one that can be conducted
based on reasonable suspicion, a lower certainty level than proba-
ble cause.49
Even some of the lowest rankings call into question Supreme
Court conclusions on the scope of the Fourth Amendment. As
noted above,"0 the Court has held that inspections of jail cells
(R = 6), helicopter overflights (R = 10), and rummaging through
garbage (R = 13) are not searches. Yet it has also held that in-
spections of burned-down houses and safety inspections of resi-
dences (ranked in the same general range, at R = 5 and R = 11,
respectively) do implicate the Fourth Amendment 5 ' Similarly, the
Court considers a thirty-second roadblock stop (R = 14) a seizure
(albeit one which requires virtually no suspicion),52 but has held
that compelling a person to speak for purposes of obtaining a
voiceprint (R = 15) is not.5 3 If, as the rankings suggest, these var-
ious types of government conduct involve similar infringements on
privacy and autonomy, the Court's differential treatment of them
may be suspect.
Frequent contrasts between the Court's decisions and the
survey's results also occur when one looks at those police actions
that the Court has been willing to label a "search" or "seizure,"
but that have not been accorded "full" Fourth Amendment
protections (that is, requiring a warrant based on probable cause)
because of perceived reduced privacy or autonomy expectations.
For instance, the Court has held that searches of offices for work-
related infractions do not require probable cause, and may not
require even reasonable suspicion, in part because of the conclu-
sion that a person has a reduced expectation of privacy at the
office.' Yet this scenario was ranked at 27, with a mean of 63.11,
49. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968).
50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
51. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 303-04 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (advo-
cating notice of post-fire inspection of house if inspection conducted just after fire, and a
warrant if conducted well after fire); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(holding that residential health and safety inspection requires administrative warrant, the
granting of which depends on reasonableness of intrusion).
52. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
53. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (grand jury subpoena of person
forcing him to speak for purposes of voiceprint not a seizure).
54. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("IThe privacy
1993]
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well above a frisk (R = 19, M = 54.76), which requires reasonable
suspicion. The Court has also permitted the government to con-
duct suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of its employees, using
urinalysis and blood extraction with a needle, based partly on the
assertion that the employees concerned (that is, railway workers
involved in accidents and customs agents seeking promotion) have
diminished expectations of privacy at the workplace.5 The analo-
gous scenarios in the survey did not specify the type of employees
involved, and thus may not have fairly tested the cases in front of
the Court. But it is still worth noting that both types of testing
were ranked very high (urinalysis at 39 and needle testing at 46),
well above, for instance, searches of cars, which typically require
probable cause.
As a final example of dissonance between the Court's conclu-
sions and the conclusions of the respondents to our survey, consid-
er a seizure case. In Florida v. Bostick,56 the Court strongly sug-
gested that police efforts to detect drug smuggling by singling out
a passenger on a bus and asking if his luggage may be searched
either is not a seizure or is only a minimal one, because such a
person should normally feel free to "terminate the encounter." Yet
this scenario is ranked at 44, well above questioning on the side-
walk for ten minutes (R = 36), which is clearly a seizure. (It is
also ranked well above another seizure scenario, that describing a
custodial arrest (R = 28), but, for reasons to be discussed later, 7
the latter ranking is probably an anomaly.)
B. Possible Responses to the Results
As with any information that comes before them, the Justices
of the Supreme Court could react to the empirical results de-
interests of government employees in their place of work. . . while not insubstantial, are
far less than those found at home or in some other contexts.").
55. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (railway
workers); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (cus-
toms agents).
56. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). The Court did not decide whether a "bus boarding" is a
seizure, remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court. But in doing so it stated that
"no seizure occurs when police ask questions of an individual, ask to examine the
individual's identification, and request consent to search his or her luggage-so long as
the officers do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required." Id.
at 2388. And it made clear that such action in "the cramped confines of a bus" was not
"dispositive" of the seizure issue. Id. at 2389.
57. See infra text accompanying note 114.
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scribed above in one of four ways: they could reject it (which
includes the option of ignoring the information altogether); they
could alter the legal analysis in an attempt to reduce or eliminate
the relevance of the data; they could incorporate it into their
decisionmaking process, which in this case would require reversal
of several cases; or (the most unlikely option) they could use the
information as a springboard for developing a new analytical mod-
el, here a model of the Fourth Amendment based more forthright-
ly on intrusiveness as perceived by members of the community.
1. Rejection. As several commentators have pointed out,58
the Supreme Court has frequently refused to consider empirical
information, or has given it short shrift. Although such a reaction
has not always been justified,' 9 caution in relying on research re-
sults is well founded, for a number of reasons. As summarized by
Professors Monahan and Walker in their seminal work on the use
of social science data by the courts, "[c]ourts should place confi-
dence in a piece of scientific research [only] to the extent that the
research (1) has survived the critical review of the scientific com-
munity; (2) has employed valid research methods; (3) is generaliz-
able to the case at issue; and (4) is supported by a body of other
research."'  Like much of the research that has come before the
courts,6' our research can be challenged on all four grounds.
In our case, the first and fourth factors listed by Monahan
and Walker are the easiest to apply. Since we have just published
our results,62 they have not been subjected to "critical review."
58. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences on
Law and Policy, 10 LAW & POL'Y 167, 187-91 (1988); Ronald Roesch et al., Social Sci-
ence and the Courts: The Role of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 1, 5
(1991). But see Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 335 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court
"has increasingly relied upon data-based arguments").
59. For a description of the Court's misapplication of the research on the effects of
jury size, see David Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Su-
preme Court, and the Size of the Jury, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1004 (1980).
60. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 499 (1986).
61. As one study noted, the reason why much empirical work fails on methodological
grounds is that it is not conducted or presented by social scientists with training in re-
search. James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and Briefs, 14
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 40 (1990).
62. In addition to this Article, a much abbreviated description of our research, aimed
at a behavioral science audience, appears in 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (1993), under
1993]
HeinOnline  -- 42 Duke L.J.  743 1992-1993
744 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:727
And, to our knowledge, ours is the only attempt to gauge directly
societal perceptions of intrusiveness related to police searches and
seizures,6 and thus is not supported by similar findings.
The second and third factors can be discussed in more detail.
By "valid research imethods," Monahan and Walker mean to refer
to the "internal validity" or logic of the study, as opposed to its
"external validity" or applicability to the outside world, which is
the focus of their third criterion. With respect to the internal va-
lidity of our research, the question for present purposes is whether
the research design accurately measured how people rank the
intrusiveness of various searches and seizures.6 We think, on the
whole, that it did. For instance, the Intrusiveness Rating Scale did
not "telegraph" our hypotheses to the participants.' Its instruc-
tions were easily understood.6 The scenarios were clearly de-
scribed and easy to understand.
It should be noted, however, that some of the people sur-
veyed may not have taken the task seriously. The participants
were given as much time as necessary to complete the survey and
were asked to look over all of the scenarios before rating any of
them. But some completed the survey in under twenty minutes,
and a perusal of the forms suggested that a few failed to make
sure their ratings were internally consistent (for example, one form
ranked a body cavity search as less intrusive than a roadblock).
the title Rating the Intrusiveness of Law Enforcement Searches and Seizures.
63. Two related works are Kagehiro et al., supra note 30, and Mark A. Small, The
Role of Perception of Privacy Invasions in a Psychology of Jurisprudence (1990) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska at Lincoln). Kagehiro's work focuses on
the expectations of privacy people have vis-d-vis those with whom they share premises or
property. Small's research obtained "ratings of offensiveness" associated with intrusive
activities found in tort cases.
64. We address here only the internal validity of the survey for purposes of obtain-
ing the rankings in Table 1. Other internal validity problems, associated with the con-
ditions devised to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, are discussed in Part III. See infra text ac-
companying notes 113, 120-23.
65. The related dangers of "experimenter expectancies" and participant "hypothesis
guessing" are well-known. David L Faigman, To Have and To Have Not: Assessing the
Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.. 1005, 1062-63
(1989). Our participants were not aware that different conditions were involved, and the
purpose of the research was not explained beyond what was obvious from the instruc-
tions (described supra in Section I(B)).
66. Although we were available for questions, no participant came to us for further
explanation as- to how to fill out the form. A few participants in the No Evidence condi-
tion wrote on the form that they might have rated some of the scenarios differently had
they known what the police were looking for.
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Also calling into question the sincerity or comprehension of a
small number of participants are the facts that all but the three
least intrusive scenarios were given a "100" rating by at least one
person, and many of the most intrusive scenarios were given a "0"
rating by at least one participant. Of course, one purpose of hav-
ing a large group of people complete the survey is'to diminish the
impact of errant participants; there did not appear to be many of
the latter.
Assuming that most of the participants took the task seriously
and understood it, one might still question the meaningfulness of
the means (and therefore the rankings) in Table 1, given the small
number of subjects involved (217). For instance, how significant is
a ranking of 20 compared to a ranking of 25 in this study? We
were able to answer this type of question by computing confidence
intervals. Using a standard formula,67 we found that the confi-
dence interval for the frisk scenario, for example, is 3.1; this num-
ber means that, given the size of our sample and the relevant
standard deviation, the mean for that scenario (which Table 1
shows as 54.76) could be as low as 51.7 or as high as 57.9. Using
the same formula, we found that the interval for an open fields
search could be as low as 52.75 and as high as 60.25, thus indicat-
ing a high degree of overlap between the frisk and the open fields
search scenarios (R = 19 and R = 21, respectively). On the other
hand, there is no overlap between the confidence interval for the
frisk scenario and the confidence intervals of scenarios depicting
car searches (M = 64.7 to M = 69.7) or jail searches (M = 27.6 to
M = 33.7). In general, although confidence intervals vary for each
item given the different standard deviations, those scenarios in
Table 1 whose means differ by less than seven probably represent
comparable intrusiveness rankings, whereas the relative ranking of
those scenarios whose means differ by more than seven can be
said to be statistically meaningful.
Whereas its internal validity may withstand scrutiny, our study
is more vulnerable under Monahan and Walker's final criterion for
67. The formula is: (MEAN ± (1.96 x STANDARD DEVIATION)) + 47N, where N
represents the number in the sample (here 217) and the mean and standard deviation are
taken from Table 1. By way of explanation, the formula states that the confidence level
is equal to the item mean plus or minus the Z value (which allows reporting of scores
from different normal distributions on a comparable basis at the 95% confidence inter-
val), times the item's standard deviation, divided by the square root of the total sample.
IM9]
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evaluating the acceptability of social science information: the "ex-
ternal validity" or "generalizability" of the research. Before can-
vassing the most significant external validity problems, we want to
discount two possible "definitional" arguments against the
generalizability of our study. First, one might contend that the
Supreme Court's use of the word "reasonable" in defining both
the privacy interests implicated by searches and the autonomy
interests implicated by seizures renders data about the expectations
of average citizens only marginally useful; according to this view,
the rankings obtained here would at most establish a "baseline,"
but cannot be viewed as dispositive, since it is up to the Court to
decide whether the expectations are "reasonable," "justifiable," or
"legitimate." At least in the search context, however, this argu-
ment is substantially undercut by the Court's repeated statements
that "[l]egitimation of expectations 'of privacy ... must [come
from] ... understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society. ' Moreover, if most people felt that, say, police confron-
tation of a bus passenger was a significant restraint on freedom,
the Court would be torturing the concept of reasonableness to
hold that such a perception was "unreasonable."
A related objection might be that the survey participants are
not likely to think of "privacy," "autonomy," and "intrusiveness"
(the words used in the instructions to the Intrusiveness Rating
Scale Survey) in the same way the Court does, and thus a poll of
citizens on these issues can never directly address the question the
Court has in mind. It is no doubt true both that different people
define these words differently and that, as the survey results them-
selves indicate,69 the "intrusiveness" of a given search or seizure
is perceived differently from person to person. But again, the
Court has stated that these nebulous terms are to be defined with
reference to community values. Presumably, it is better to assess
those values by asking representative members of the community
about them than by relying on what nine members of a rather
isolated Court might conjecture.
68. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978). Contrast this language with the
Court's analysis in third-party consent cases, evaluating expectations of privacy in terms
of what a reasonable officer would surmise from the circumstances. See supra note 3.
69. As noted earlier, for example, with the exception of those scenarios at the ex-
tremes of the rankings, every scenario had a range from 0 to 100, meaning that at least
one participant gave each of these scenarios a "0" score, and at least one gave it a
"100" score.
[V ol. 42:727
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Ambiguity in the legal definition of intrusiveness could dimin-
ish the generalizability of this study in two other ways, however.
First, as noted earlier, in order to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, some
participants received First Person descriptions of the scenarios, and
others Third Person descriptions; some participants had to rate
scenarios in which the objective of the government action was
specified, and others scenarios in which the objective was not spec-
ified. While these variations enabled us to draw some interesting
conclusions about how people evaluate intrusiveness (described in
Part IH), they may have also distorted the ranking for each sce-
nario under a definition of intrusiveness that incorpoiates only
some of these conditions.
To be more specific about this problem, assume that the "cor-
rect" way of thinking about the intrusiveness of a search or seizure
is from the "First Person/No Evidence" perspective." Although
rankings based solely on the ratings of those participants given this
combination of conditions are not significantly different from those
found in Table 1, the relative rankings for some of the scenarios
emphasized in the above discussion do change when ranked solely
under these conditions. Most noticeably, the frisk moves up in
rank (to R = 24, M = 66.98), whereas the dog sniff scenario moves
down (to R = 21, M = 66.25), as does the open fields search (to
R = 15, M = 54.51). Similarly, the means for the burned-down
house and residential inspection scenarios go up substantially (to
M = 47.65 and M = 51.12, respectively), whereas the means for
the jail cell, helicopter overflight, and garbage scenarios stay
roughly the same (at M = 32.88, M = 42.07, and M = 46.26, re-
spectively). Because, for reasons noted earlier,7' small variations
between means cannot be considered significant, these changes do
not undercut the validity of the comparisons we made in previous
discussion.7 Nonetheless, they illustrate the obvious point that
70. This perspective may or may not be the "legally correct" perspective, although
we argue later that the First Person perspective makes more sense than the Third Person
perspective, given the subjective nature of the intrusiveness question, and that the No
Evidence perspective is superior to the Yes Evidence perspective when the police do not
explain their action. See infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
71. See supra text accompanying note 67.
72. Compare, for instance, the confidence intervals of the following scenarios under
the "First Person/No Evidence" condition:
Jail search 25.2 to 40.4
Helicopter search 33.8 to 50.2
1993]
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ratings of "intrusiveness" can change depending upon the legal
definition given that term.
A second definitional ambiguity that could affect the
generalizability of this study has to do with the identity of the
person conducting the search or seizure. As noted in the descrip-
tion of the research design," we asked the participants to assume
that the various intrusions described in -the Intrusiveness Rating
Scale were carried out by government agents. In a study meant to
assess the intrusiveness of investigative searches and seizures, this
assumption seemed necessary. Yet some of the Court's cases have
implied that Fourth Amendment privacy is to be gauged in terms
of expectations vis-d-vis any person, not just the police. Thus, for
instance, in explaining why police flights over fenced-in backyards
are not searches, the Court has made much of the "fact" that
passenger planes and helicopters fly over peoples' houses, low
enough to allow occupants to view the contents of their yards, on
a routine basis.7' Leaving aside the possible inaccuracy of this
assertion, the difference, in terms of invasiveness, between casual
overflights by disinterested observers and police efforts to find
evidence of crime seems obvious.75 But the Court's cases have
indicated that this difference may not be relevant for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Assuming so, this study's findings with
respect to helicopter overflights would not be generalizable. The
same point can be made with respect to other scenarios represent-
ing cases in which the Court has indicated that the identity and
Garbage search 38.2 to 54.3
Search of burned-down house 38.8 to 56.4
Residential inspection 43.5 to 69.9
Open fields search 45.9 to 63.1
Dog sniff of person 57.7 to 74.8
Frisk 59.4 to 74.6
73. See supra Section I(B).
74. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (Officer who saw marijuana in
backyard from helicopter did not engage in search because "[a]ny member of the public
could legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400
feet and could have observed Riley's greenhouse. The police officer did no more.");
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (no search when officers saw marijuana
in backyard from airplane because "[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace
who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed").
75. As the state court in Ciraolo noted, the officers' "focused" observations of the
defendant's backyard were not what most people expect from the air-flying public. People
v. Ciraolo, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96-97 (1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
[V9I. 42.727
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purpose of the intruder is not relevant for purposes of assessing
privacy expectations.76
The external validity problems discussed above concern
whether our study addressed the right issues. Also relevant to its
external validity are three other aspects of the research, having to
do with the manner in which the legal issues were addressed. First,
for efficiency purposes, we described each scenario in one sen-
tence. Thus, although the scenarios often replicated actual Su-
preme Court and other court cases, they did so only in a bare-
bones fashion that makes association of the rankings here with at
least some of those cases suspect. For instance, as already not-
ed,' the rankings of the two scenarios concerning employee drug
and alcohol testing might have been quite different (and might
have conformed more closely to the Court's conclusions about
privacy expectations) had the scenarios included descriptions of the
types of employees tested in the cases confronting the Court.
Second, one can justifiably wonder whether ratings on a sur-
vey form translate into a realistic assessment of how the person
giving the ratings would feel if actually subjected to the particular
search and seizure.78 However, this external validity problem is
probably not significant. For reasons Part III will make clear,7 9 if
they are not already, we think that any distortion of the results
that occurred by virtue of this phenomenon would have led the
survey participants to underestimate the intrusiveness of the sce-
narios; more "realistic" results would, if anything, strengthen our
critique of the Court's decisions concerning expectations of privacy.
In any event, it should be remembered that we were primarily
interested in obtaining a relative ranking among the scenarios.
Even if a "realism" problem exists, it would probably affect the
76. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (inspection of garbage
not a search because it is "common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the
side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and
other members of the public") (footnotes omitted). But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 167-68 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("The distinctions the [majority] would draw are
based on relationships between private parties, but the Fourth Amendment is concerned
with the relationship of one of those parties to the government.").
77. See supra text accompanying note 55.
78. This is a frequent criticism of academic research. See Faigman, supra note 65, at
1059-60.
79. See infra text accompanying note 110.
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rating of each scenario roughly equally, and thus not change sig-
nificantly the hierarchy represented in Table 1.
Third, one might question whether our participants mirror the
"society" referred to by the Court. Of the four subject groups
(college undergraduates, law students, general community mem-
bers, and Australians), two in particular are suspect. More than a
quarter of our subjects were from Australia and thus cannot be
said to provide representative American values; and a similar
proportion of the sample was composed of law students, who are
arguably "tainted" given their exposure to due process concerns
(although none had taken criminal procedure). In fact, the Austra-
lians gave the lowest overall ratings and the law students gave the
highest.' At the same time, the Australians' ratings were not
significantly different from those given by the USC undergraduate
group; and the law students' ratings were not significantly different
from those obtained from the "general community,"8' a category
which varied significantly in terms of employment (for example,
secretaries, hospital technicians, and truck drivers).' Although a
larger and more diverse sample would have been preferable, the
sample used does not seem to be clearly unrepresentative of the
population.
Considering these various concerns with our research in com-
bination, a court would not be remiss if it refused to accord the
results of this study dispositive weight. Particularly important in
this regard is the lack of replication, and the fact that, at least
with respect to some scenarios, identification of the intruder as a
law enforcement officer might not have accurately reflected the
relevant legal question. On the other hand, we believe that the
80. Using a one-way analysis of variance and the Duncan Multiple Comparisons Test,
we found that American law students and citizens from the general community produced
higher overall ratings, at a statistically significant level, than the USC undergraduates and
the Australians. The American law students' ratings were insignificantly higher than the
general community's, and the USC undergraduates' ratings were insignificantly higher
than the Australians'.
81. See supra note 80.
82. Of the demographic variables that were coded (age, race, gender, and education),
only age correlated with intrusiveness ratings, r = .19, p < .01 (see infra note 128 for an
explanation of these figures), where younger individuals gave the scenarios intrusiveness
ratings lower than those given by the older individuals, overall; we found no other signif-
icant overall trends regarding demographic variables. With respect to a few of the indi-
vidual scenarios, some racial and gender differences did develop, but these differences are
hard to interpret given the size of the sample.
[Vol. 42:727
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methodology reported here is not so flawed that a court address-
ing Fourth Amendment issues would err in giving the results sig-
nificant consideration. In any event, for discussion purposes, we
will assume that our results are valid so as to allow us to explore
three other possible judicial responses to data of this type.
2. Changing the Analysis to Avoid the Data. Assuming that
our research can meet Monahan and Walker's conditions for judi-
cial consideration, thus making it difficult to ignore, the Court
could still render the data irrelevant, or of only minimal impor-
tance, through an alteration of the analytical framework. Here, the
Court would have three options. It could decide that intrusiveness
is no longer a relevant consideration in Fourth Amendment cases.
Or it could hold that intrusiveness remains relevant, but that com-
munity values are no longer pertinent to its definition. Finally, as
it has already done in certain types of cases, it could decide that
community values can be trumped by government interests.
The first option is probably prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment itself. At minimum, it can be said that the drafters of the
Amendment were concerned about the impact of government
searches on their property, privacy, and personal security; eliminat-
ing intrusiveness as a factor in Fourth Amendment analysis would
violate their intent. 3 Furthermore, removing intrusiveness as a
consideration in Fourth Amendment cases would probably render
the Amendment meaningless. For instance, in assessing the "rea-
sonableness" of a search or seizure, the Court has always balanced
the state's interest against the individual's.' Because no other
83. The English decision most often viewed as the precursor to the Fourth Amend-
ment is Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). There, Lord Camden held that a
general warrant authorizing the search of a private home for papers was invalid, stating
that "we can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what
they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society, for papers are
often the dearest property a man can have." Id. at 817.
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
"it may be confidently asserted that [Entick's] propositions were in the minds of those
who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as suffi-
ciently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at
626-27; see also 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965) (recounting that James Otis argued that general writs "totally annihi-
late" a person's privilege to be safe in the home because "[c]ustom house officers may
enter our houses when they please").
84. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) ("Our cases show that in
determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
1993]
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"individual interest" readily comes to mind as a replacement for
intrusiveness, this first option would in effect allow the government
to conduct any search or seizure for which it could give a reason.
The second option-that of retaining intrusiveness as an inqui-
ry but basing its definition on something other than community
values-is not much more attractive because of its probable impact
on the Court as an institution. Because many of the Court's con-
clusions about expectations of privacy and autonomy violate com-
mon-sense notions of how people react to the police, its sincerity
has already been called into question by several commentators.85
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (constitutionality of a particular search
depends on a "balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers"); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (justifying the Court's holding by asserting that it gave "full
recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing,
best fulfill[ed] the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from unrea-
sonable government invasions of privacy").
As noted below, see infra text accompanying notes 90-94, the definitions of
"search" and "seizure" may also be subject to such balancing, although the Court has
rarely explicitly said so.
85. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of
"Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541
(1988); Rachel A. Van Cleave, Michigan v. Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is There
No End to the War Between the Constitution and Common Sense?, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 203
(1988). The Court also appears to have rejected the intermediate approach, suggested by
the language in Rakas, of focusing entirely on the extent to which property law (at best,
an indirect reflection of community values) provides protection against the kind of action
taken by the government. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding
that police entry onto private fields surrounded by fences and "No Trespassing" signs is
not a search).
The Court's unrealistic assessments of privacy and autonomy are due both to its
crime control orientation and its belief that the police can be trusted. According to Pro-
fessor Bookspan, "[t]hese definitional limitations [on searches] are the product of two
milestones on the Court's social agenda: (1) a desire to allow more aggressive police
investigative methods to root out crime, and (2) a distaste for the exclusionary rule-a
sanction that disarms damning evidence." Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant
Requirement. Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 495 (1991).
And according to Professor Maclin:
Realistically, the Court would probably acknowledge, if pushed, that police con-
duct in Riley [the helicopter case] and Greenwood [the garbage case] does con-
stitute government intrusion that threatens legitimate privacy interests. What ex-
plains the results in these cases? The Court assumes that these intrusions will
happen only to individuals like Riley and Greenwood. Thus, a majority of the
Court trusts the police to target the "right" people.
Tracey MacIn, Justice Thurgood Marshalk Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77
CORNELL L REv. 723, 745 (1992). As Maclin points out, this trust is misplaced: "The
police subject many innocent people to such intrusions. Yet the problem lies in the fact
that the Court seldom, if ever, reviews such cases when deciding search and seizure is-
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Assuming valid data showing that the community and the Court
think differently, the Court's continued adherence to its own
views, through what has aptly been called "normative constitution-
al fact-finding," 6 would further strain its credibility. As Professor
Faigman has noted, "[u]ltimately, persistent misapplication of em-
pirical data [or, in this case, the ignoring of such data] undermines
the Court's legitimacy. '
The analytical approach most likely to succeed in minimizing
empirical research such as ours is to concede that it is dispositive
on the intrusiveness issue but to neutralize its effect by identifying
countervailing government interests that supersede the individual
interests involved. As just noted, in cases involving government
actions it has denominated as searches and seizures, the Court has
already adopted a balancing formula which could accomplish this
objective. For instance, consider the Court's decisions regulating
searches in the workplace for work-related infractions or drug or
alcohol use.' Our data could be used to argue that such searches
are inore intrusive than the Court believes, and thus require great-
er authorization under the Fourth Amendment than currently man-
dated. Yet the Court could finesse this argument and affirm its
current holdings--even while agreeing that it was wrong about the
intrusiveness of rummaging through desk drawers or sticking nee-
dles in employees' arms-simply by placing greater emphasis on
countervailing factors (such as the need for informal searches in
the workplace) which it has already indicated are relevant to the
analysis.89
sues." Id.
86. David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-finding". Exploring the Empir-
ical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 581-88 (1991).
87. Id. at 604; see also Gary B. Melton, Family and Mental Hospital as Myths: Civil
Commitment of Minors, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW 151, 158-59 (N.
Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984) (arguing that factual assumptions in Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979), concerning commitment of minors, ignore empirical reality); Peter
W. Sperlich, And Then There Were Six: The Decline of the American Jury, 63 JUDICA-
TURE 262, 275-79 (1980) (arguing that various "hidden agendas" motivated the Court's
decisions on jury size, despite countervailing empirical evidence).
88. This caselaw is described supra in the text accompanying notes 54-55.
89. For instance, in justifying warrantless workplace searches on less than probable
cause in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court not only concluded that the
intrusion occasioned by a workplace search is minimal, i&. at 725, but also asserted that
(1) "the imposition of a[n unwieldy] warrant requirement would conflict with 'the com-
mon-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter,'" id. at 722; (2) "[t]he delay in correcting the
1993]
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The Court has yet to countenance a similar balancing test in
determining the definitions of "search" and "seizure." To date, the
threshold of the Fourth Amendment has depended almost exclu-
sively on expectations of privacy and autonomy, without reference
to government interests.90 But the Court could change its ap-
proach; indeed, doing so might merely make explicit what has
already been implicit in the Court's cases in this area. Professor
LaFave has argued, for instance, that the Court probably does not
really believe that a person feels free to leave when confronted by
a uniformed police officer, but that its holdings to the contrary
91
can still be justified on the ground that, as a matter of policy, the
police "should be allowed 'to seek cooperation, even where this
may involve inconvenience or embarrassment for the citizen, and
even though many citizens will defer to this authority of the police
because they believe-in some vague way-that they should.' 1)92
One can disagree with the legitimacy of the government interest
LaFave identifies,' or with the idea that balancing is relevant at
employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable sus-
picion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work,
and ultimately to the public interest," id. at 724; and (3) "jijt is simply unrealistic to
expect supervisors in most government agencies to learn the subtleties of the probable
cause standard," id. at 724-25. Assuming the Court's assumption about the intrusiveness
of a workplace search is proven wrong, the Court can merely emphasize the weightiness
of the last three factors in reaffirming its decision in Ortega.
90. The two exceptions to this rule are the companion cases of United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), and United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), which held
that grand jury subpoenas seeking voice (Dionisio) and handwriting (Mara) exemplars are
not seizures under the Fourth Amendment given the minimal intrusion involved and the
grand jury's entitlement to every man's evidence. The Court has yet to use a balancing
test in defining when a police action is a search or seizure.
91. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (strongly suggesting that ques-
tioning of a bus passenger by two armed officers is not a seizure); Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1 (1984) (plainclothes officer's request of defendant, after showing badge, to
accompany him 15 feet to other companions not a seizure); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210 (1984) (factory workers confronted by armed immigration officials and asked ques-
tions while factory exits are guarded not a seizure).
92. Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth
Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 741 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.1 commentary at 258 (1975)).
93. For instance, the "duty to cooperate" proposed by LaFave would give police
legal authority to engage in behavior that would be viewed by some individuals as ha-
rassing or discriminatory. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968) (describing fric-
tion created between the police and minority groups by the "'[m]isuse of field
interrogations"' and "aggressive patrols."); see also MICHAEL BROWN, WORKING THE
STREETs 170-79 (1981) (describing how police might abuse this authority).
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all in determining when the Fourth Amendment is implicated.94
But straightforward adoption of this approach would once again
permit the Court to marginalize the impact of our research.
3. Overruling Previous Decisions. Assuming the framework
for analyzing Fourth Amendment cases is not changed in the ways
described above, we believe that the Supreme Court would have
no legitimate justification for rejecting, ignoring, or minimizing the
results of research such as ours. Indeed, when empirical work is
directly relevant to the legal issue, Monahan and Walker argue
that valid empirical work should be treated in the same way as
legal authority.95 This type of "social authority" could be present-
ed to the Court in briefs in the same way as precedent,96 and
should be as binding on the lower courts as previous judicial deci-
sions.
In this view, the Court would be forced to change a number
of its rulings. The rulings most vulnerable in this regard are those
defining "search" and "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes.
As already indicated, assuming the Court does not change its
decisions concluding that frisks, stops, and home inspections impli-
cate the Fourth Amendment, results of our study suggest that
several government actions currently considered outside the ambit
of the Fourth Amendment should be accorded constitutional pro-
tection because they infringe on societal expectations of privacy or
autonomy. In particular, undercover activities, use of dogs to de-
tect odors on people, and (perhaps) searches of open fields would
be constitutionally regulated, if the Court is to remain consistent
with its decision that an intrusion at the level of a frisk is a
search.98 Similarly, a confrontation with a bus passenger would be
94. Although balancing may be a natural way of implementing the "reasonableness"
command of the Fourth Amendment, that command applies only to actions that have
already been labelled "searches" and "seizures." The language of the Fourth Amendment
does not suggest that determining whether an action is a search or seizure depends upon
a balancing of government and individual interests. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 370 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he presence of the word 'unreasonable' in
the text of the Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the
authority to answer all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision
of the social good."); Maclin, supra note 16, at 1302-03.
95. Monahan & Walker, supra note 60, at 488-95.
96. Id. at 495-97.
97. Id. at 514-16.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
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considered a seizure,. assuming the Court holds to its conclusion
that a ten-minute stop is a seizure.9
Furthermore, if inspections of burned-down houses and resi-
dential safety inspections continue to be considered searches, vari-
ous other types of police conduct not currently governed by the
Fourth Amendment could easily be subject to such regulation,
including looking through jail cells, flying over backyards, and
rummaging through garbage left at curbside."° Similarly, if stop-
ping drivers at a roadblock remains a seizure, then following a
pedestrian in a police car and detaining someone to obtain a
voiceprint might also have to be designated as seizures. 1°'
Of course, the Court could take a different tack. Rather than
overruling decisions finding that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated, it could decide to overrule the decisions concerning
frisks, stops, and residential inspections that are used as "baseline"
intrusiveness measures in the above paragraphs. In other words,
the Court could decide that, for Fourth Amendment protections to
be triggered, greater intrusiveness than that associated with these
baseline types of searches and seizures is required. This move
would not slight the research or current Fourth Amendment theo-
ry; rather, the Court would be stating that, while community val-
ues are still important in setting the Fourth Amendment threshold,
that threshold is now set at a higher level. Of course, this move
would exempt a wide range of highly intrusive government ac-
tions-including frisks-from constitutional regulation, a result the
Court is unlikely to consider.
With respect to government actions that are considered
searches and seizures, the impact of the research would be some-
what different. To use workplace investigations as an example
once again, if desk rummaging is more intrusive than the Court
says' it is, then the Court would have to adjust accordingly the
balancing analysis it uses in such cases. Because this analysis is so
amorphous, a Court bent on affirming its pre-research decisions
might find it easy to do so. But this objective should be more
difficult to achieve here than in the situation discussed in the
previous section," in which the Court simply changes the rele-
99. See supra text accompanying note 56.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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vant analysis. Although the distinction is admittedly subtle, in the
latter situation the Court need merely state that just as the indi-
vidual interests involved have increased in significance (because of
empirical insights), the government interests at stake have also
become more potent. This second (unsupported) assertion could
not be made by an honest Court adhering to current Fourth
Amendment analysis. Such a Court, confronted by our research,
would normally have to come up with additional interests on the
government side of the ledger if it is to maintain the balance
struck by present holdings.
4. Forging a New Analytical Model Based on Empirical Evi-
dence. A final response to the research, related to the response
just considered, is to not only allow it to influence judicial deci-
sions but to use it as the basis for restructuring entirely the Fourth
Amendment inquiry. By way of example, we will cite one possible
framework here. Professor Slobogin has argued elsewhere that
current Fourth Amendment analysis should be jettisoned in favor
of two principles: the exigency principle and the proportionality
principle."° The exigency principle posits, contrary to the Court's
approach, that the intrusiveness of a search or seizure is irrelevant
in considering the procedural issue of when a warrant or any other
type of ex ante review is required; instead, the only issue is wheth-
er harm to others, escape of a suspect, or destruction of evidence
would occur if such review were sought." At the same time, un-
der the proportionality principle, intrusiveness should normally be
the sole criterion in deciding the substantive issue of how certain
we must be that a search or seizure will be successful before it is
allowed: in this context, the level of "probable cause" the ex ante
reviewer must find (or that must be found by the police if ex ante
review is not feasible) should be roughly proportional to the level
of intrusiveness associated with the proposed search or seizure.'
1
Under proportionality analysis, rankings such as those found
in Table 1 would serve as a useful device for determining how
much "probable cause" is necessary to conduct a particular search
or seizure. A search of foliage in a park (R = 1, M = 6.48) might
103. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L
REV. 1, 4 (1991).
104. Id. at 29-38.
105. Id. at 68-75.
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not require any suspicion, whereas a body cavity search (R = 50,
M = 90.14) would require a very high degree of confidence that
evidence would be found. The various types of investigative con-
duct in between these extremes would be authorized by a showing
of certainty relative to their ranking in Table 1' Note that al-
though the scope of the Fourth Amendment is much broader
under proportionality analysis than under the Court's cases, the
results in many of those cases might not change, since the police
may have had the requisite certainty to undertake the degree of
intrusion involved."W
The advantages and disadvantages of the proportionality rule
are discussed elsewhere."c The point here is that empirical re-
search not only can better inform judicial decisionmaking under
current law, but also can bolster different theoretical approaches.
As the next part of this Article illustrates, such research can also
help us understand the nebulous concepts of privacy, autonomy,
and intrusiveness that seem irretrievably linked to the Fourth
Amendment.
106. Obviously, rough proportionality is all that would be required in the usual case,
because a precise degree of certainty is not possible. Occasionally, a more statistically
based "success rate" might be obtainable. For instance, "drug courier profiles," which
correlate certain characteristicg of those who disembark from planes with a particular
likelihood that they are carrying drugs, might provide the police with a numerical degree
of certainty, although there are several problems associated with their use. See Morgan
Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review
of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843 (1985). For a defense of such profiles and
examples of similar investigative methods, see Slobogin, supra note 103, at 82-92.
107. See eg., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (police "received an
anonymous telephone tip that marijuana was growing in respondent's backyard"); Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984) (agents entered defendant's fields "[a]cting on
reports that marihuana was being raised on [his] farm"); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 298 (1966) (the Court suggested prior suspicion existed when it said "Partin ulti-
mately cooperated closely with federal authorities only after he discovered evidence of
jury tampering [by Hoffa].").
108. In addition to Slobogin, supra note 103, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 390-91 (1974); Craig M. Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MxcH. L REv. 1468, 1491-98 (1985); Lee Anne
Fritzler, Opt imality in Fourth Amendment Law, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 519-21
(1990).
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III. FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS OF INTRusrVENEsS:
TESTING HYPOTHESES 2, 3, AND 4
A. Results re Hypotheses 2 and 3
It will be recalled that, in addition to hypothesizing that the
Supreme Court's assessments of privacy expectations are often at
odds with society's, we also hypothesized some reasons for this
incongruence. Our hypotheses with respect to the effect of varying
the target of the search or seizure (that is, First Person vs. Third
Person) and the objective of the investigation (that is, No Evi-
dence vs. Yes Evidence) were borne out. As Table 2 shows, the
intrusiveness ratings of those participants exposed to the "First
Person/No Evidence" scenarios were the highest overall, whereas
the intrusiveness ratings of those participants exposed to the
"Third Person/Yes Evidence" scenarios were the lowest ratings
overall. These differences proved to be statistically significant.
TABLE 2
COMBINED MEAN FOR 50 SCENARIOS UNDER EACH VARIATION
Condition Combined Mean S.D.
First Person/No Evidence 63.19 20.70
Third Person/No Evidence 59.26 21.25
First Person/Yes Evidence 54.95 21.43
Third Person/Yes Evidence 48.93 21.63
Further statistical manipulation indicated that those presented
with the First Person condition generally perceived the scenarios
to be more intrusive than those presented with the Third Person
condition, regardless of whether the evidence sought was specified.
It also indicated that subjects given the No Evidence condition
rated the scenarios more intrusively than those given the Yes
Evidence condition, regardless of whether it was a First Person or
Third Person search or seizure." In short, this study provides
109. We reached this conclusion by using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test to
verify that the observed differences in intrusiveness between the First Person and Third
7591993]
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clear support for the proposition that searches and seizures tend to
be viewed as more intrusive when their target is the subject-partic-
ipant rather than "another," and when their objective is not clear
rather than specified.
These findings call into question judicial evaluations of the
privacy and autonomy interests implicated by searches and sei-
zures. Judges, especially the Justices on the Supreme Court, are
unlikely to have experienced any type of police intrusion, much
less the type of intrusion they are asked to analyze in a particular
case. Thus, they are likely to evaluate intrusiveness from a Third
Person perspective. Yet intrusiveness is probably more appropri-
ately viewed from the First Person perspective; privacy and auton-
omy are constructs that are, almost by definition, intimate, subjec-
tive, and experiential.1 In short, courts may suffer from a "dis-
tancing effect" in evaluating intrusiveness.
Person conditions and between the No Evidence and Yes Evidence conditions were statis-
tically significant, meaning that the possibility of the observed differences occurring due
to chance was below 5 out of 100 (i.e., p < .05). For each of the four conditions, the
mean (designated by M, and meaning the average intrusiveness score), the standard devi-
ation (designated by SD, and meaning the range of intrusiveness scores around the
mean), the result of the ANOVA test (designated by F), and the probability of being
sure (designated by p, and explained above), are as follows: First person (M = 3,015.34,
SD = 707.38), Third Person (M = 2,815.90, SD = 672.61: F (3,216) = 4.73, p < .05). No
Evidence (M = 3,031.02, SD = 632.68), Yes Evidence (M = 2,572.43, SD = 714.42:
F (3,216) = 22.91, p < .05). Specifying the evidence had a stronger effect than specifying
the identity of the target.
110. Consider, e.g., Gary B. Melton, Respecting Boundaries: Minors, Privacy and Be-
havioral Research, in SOCIAL RESEARCH ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 65 (Barbara
Stanley & Joan E. Sieber eds., 1992). Melton states: "One need not undertake a sophisti-
cated ethical or legal analysis to know that an invasion of privacy is degrading; it is
experienced as a personal violation." Id. at 65. Melton goes on to say:
In common parlance, privacy is "I know when I see it," an elusive construct
that has unclear and probably idiosyncratic limits. Indeed, privacy (more precise-
ly, invasion thereof) may be described better as "I know when I feel it." A gut
sense of personal violation may be the tie that binds such disparate events as
being subjected to a body search, being the subject of gossip, having one's mail
read, being asked one's income, or having one's house entered without permis-
sion. It should come as no surprise that such an intensely personal construct is
difficult to defime.
In short, common experience tells us that privacy is a subjectively impor-
tant, even critical, aspect of our lives . ...
Id. at 65-66.
It should also be noted, however, that a person who experiences a particular inva-
sion of privacy repeatedly may become inured to it, and thus not able to gauge accurately
its pristine impact. Our study does not suffer from this distorting phenomenon.
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The finding that knowledge of the police objective lowers the
perceived intrusiveness of police action may also challenge the
accuracy of judicial analysis on privacy and autonomy issues, at
least in a subset of cases. At a minimum, because the courts are
aware of the police's objectives, they are likely to underestimate
the intrusions experienced by persons subjected to unexplained
police actions; a "knowledge bias" will infect their evaluation of
such cases. Whether the courts also underestimate the intrusiveness
of police actions the objectives of which are known to the targets
is not as easily discerned from our data. The complication arises
because it is not clear how the survey participants given the Yes
Evidence condition interpreted it. Taken at face value, the Yes
Evidence condition merely states the purpose of the police, not
that it was realized. If the survey participants subjected to this
condition did take it at face value, then at most the results in
Table 2 support the conclusion, which has some intuitive appeal,
that knowing the objective of a police action diminishes its intru-
siveness; for instance, an unexplained search of luggage may be
perceived as more invasive than a search of luggage preceded by a
statement from the police that they are looking for drugs. If, on
the other hand, the subjects given the Yes Evidence condition
were led by knowledge of the objective to assume that it was, or
was likely to be, realized, then the results in Table 2 may also
reflect to some extent a "hindsight bias" effect-that is, an effect
caused by knowing or assuming the outcome of the action."' As
explored more fully below,lu to the extent the latter explanation
of our results is correct, it suggests that the courts, which know
not only the objective of the police but also that it was met, may
find it hard to evaluate intrusiveness from the perspective of the
innocent individual the Supreme Court asks us to assume.
Of course, judges may be aware of and attempt to correct for
any biasing effects which result from distancing, knowledge, and
hindsight effects. Whereas we obviously cannot tell from this study
111. For a good discussion of the hindsight bias phenomenon and its pervasive effect,
see Baruch Fischoff, Hindsight + Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
288, 292 (1975) ("Reporting an outcome's occurrence consistently . .,. alters the judged
relevance of data describing the situation preceding the event."). For research specifically
investigating the effect of hindsight bias in contexts related to the one at issue here, see
infra note 125.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15, 123-25.
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whether such self-correction occurs, we can, through investigating
the effect of the four conditions on the rankings of the scenarios,
get some sense of how strong the biasing effects are with respect
to a particular scenario (and thus how difficult they are for a
judge to resist). The relevant results are presented in Table 3.
Columns I and II again rank the scenarios one through fifty. Col-
umns III through VI show the rankings of each scenario under the
four separate conditions (that is, First Person, Third Person, No
Evidence, Yes Evidence), which we were able to tease out through
statistical analysis.113 Column VII shows the search or seizure's
"objective" for the Yes Evidence condition.
TABLE 3
INTRUSIVENESS RANKINGS UNDER
PERSON AND EVIDENCE CONDITIONS
I II III IV V VI VII
person evidence
R Scenario 1st 3d No Yes (Objective)
1. Looking in foliage in public park 1 1 1 1 (murder weapon)
2. Going through magnetometer at airport 2 2 2 2 (weapons)
3. Shining flashlight down dark alley 3 4 3 5 (drug transaction)
next to home
4. Inspecting exterior of car in public lot 4 3 3 5 (blood stains)
5. Looking through burned-down house 7 5 8 3 (evidence of arson)
6. Searching jail cell 6 8 6 7 (evidence of conspiracy)
7. Inspecting kitchen of restaurant 8 6 7 4 (health code violations)
8. Following pedestrian in police car 11 7 5 22 (determine destination)
9. Stopping all drivers at roadblock to 5 10 9 12 (illegal immigration)
view occupants
10. Flying 400 yards above backyard in 10 9 10 14 (marijuana)
helicopter
11. Inspecting plumbing and wiring of 14 11 13 10 (damage)
residence
12. Pat-down at border 12 12 12 11 (drugs)
13. Going through garbage in opaque 13 13 11 16 (forgery)
bags at curbside
14. Stopping drivers at roadblock for 9 16 15 13 (drunkenness)
30-second questioning at night
113. For the First Person ranking for each scenario, the mean intrusiveness rating was
derived from the ratings of those subjects who were given either the "First Person/No
Evidence" or "First Person/Yes Evidence" condition. For the Third Person ranking for
each scenario, the mean intrusiveness rating was derived from the ratings of those sub-
jects who were given either the "Third PNrson/No Evidence" or "Third Person/Yes Evi-
dence" condition.
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TABLE 3 (CoNINUME)
i i m IVVvi VII
person evidence
R Scenario 1st 3d No Yes (Objective)
Obtaining a voiceprint
Searching a coal mine
Searching a private junkyard
Using a beeper to track car
Pat-down
20. Search of newspaper office
21. Search of cornfields surrounded
by fence and "No Trespassing" signs
22. Fingerprinting in back of police car
23. Dog sniff of body
24. Searching bedroom of probationer
25. Searching a sixth-grader's locker
26. Rummaging through suitcase at airport
27. Going through drawers at office
28. Arrest, handcuffing, and detention
for 48 hours
29. Looking in trunk of car on public
street
30. Searching interior of car on public
highway
31. Using chauffeur as undercover agent
32. Searching footlocker found in car
33. Watching person in front yard with
binoculars
34. Using secretary as undercover agent
35. Searching yacht at sea
36. Questioning on public sidewalk
for 10 minutes
37. Searching a garage
38. Perusing bank records
39. Accompanying to urinal at work
and listening for sounds of urination
40. Hospital surgery on shoulder
41. Searching high school student's purse
42. Tapping into corporation's computer
43. Search of college dormitory room
44. Boarding a bus and asking to search
luggage
45. Searching mobile home
46. Needle in arm at work to get blood
47. Search of a bedroom
48. Reading a personal diary
49. Monitoring phone for 30 days
50. Body cavity search at border
17 22 17 30
26 18 18 24
30 31 32 25
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Note that within the seven scenarios ranked at the top of the
Table and the six scenarios at the bottom there is very little varia-
tion between the four conditions (as shown in Columns III
through VI). There was thus widespread agreement among the
survey participants, regardless of the conditions to which they were
exposed, as to the rankings at the extreme ends of the hierarchy.
In many of the thirty-seven intermediate scenarios, on the other
hand, there are greater ranking variations between conditions.
Unfortunately, many of these variations are ambiguous, due to an
inevitable attribute of the ranking system used here: once one
scenario is ranked differently across conditions (for example, 1, 2,
1, 1), at least one other scenario will of necessity be ranked incon-
sistently as well (for example, 2, 1, 2, 2). In light of this "ranking
variance" phenomenon, differences in ranking within a scenario
are hard to interpret; it is probable that small differences in a
scenario's ranking across the four conditions are meaningless.
TABLE 4
FOCUS SCENARIOS AND INTRuSIvENESs RANKINGS
I I III IV V VI VII
person evidence
R Scenario 1st 3d No Yes (Objective)
1. Following pedestrian in police car (R-8) 11 7 5 22 (determine destination)
2. Searching a coal mine (R=16) 16 17 22 8 (safety violations)
3. Pat-down (R=19) 19 21 27 9 (at airport after
terrorist threat)
4. Search of newspaper office (R=20) 17 22 17 30 (picture)
5. Rummaging through suitcase at 21 27 25 33 (drugs)
airport (R=26)
6. Arrest, handcuffing, and detention 40 26 31 26 (rape charges)
for 48 hours (R=28)
7. Using chauffeur as undercover 35 30 34 23 (organized crime)
agent (R=31)
8. Using secretary as undercover 39 29 37 28 (organized crime)
agent (R=34)
9. Questioning on public sidewalk 32 37 26 47 (determine destination)
for 10 minutes (R=36)
10. Boarding a bus and asking to 48 34 45 44 (drugs)
search luggage (R=44)
Nonetheless, we felt compelled to examine the most significant
variations between condition rankings further. Arbitrarily selecting
764 [Vol. 42.727
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those scenarios in which the difference between any two condition
rankings was ten or more produced ten "Focus Scenarios," which
are reproduced for ease of reference in Table 4. In these scenari-
os, the difference in conditions had their greatest effect and can
plausibly be said to have escaped the "ranking variance" problem
described above. Further analysis of these Focus Scenarios yields
some insights into how people may perceive intrusiveness.
B. How Intrusiveness Is Perceived: Three Theories
Looking solely at the ten Focus Scenarios, we were able to
test our initial hypotheses about the effects of the First and Third
Person conditions, and the No and Yes Evidence conditions (that
is, Hypotheses 2 and 3). Three Focus Scenarios (6, 8, and 10)
show a "significant" differential (that is a difference of ten or
greater) between the First and Third Person conditions, all in the
direction predicted by our hypothesis that the First Person condi-
tion would be rated as more intrusive. Additionally, four of the
Focus Scenarios (2, 3, 7, and 8) show a significantly greater rank-
ing in the No Evidence condition than in the Yes Evidence condi-
tion, correlating with our hypothesis that the former condition
would be rated as more intrusive. However, there are four Focus
Scenarios (1, 4, 5, and 9) that exhibit a strong differential between
the No and Yes Evidence conditions in a direction opposite to that
predicted.
Building on our initial hypotheses about the effects of the
conditions (especially Hypothesis 3, involving the No and Yes
Evidence conditions), we arrived at three possible theories that
may explain these various results (as well as many of the "less
significant" variations within other scenarios). They are: (1) the
"inference of guilt" theory; (2) the "dangerousness" theory; and
(3) the "implied consent" theory. Some of the results can be ex-
plained by more than one of these theories.
1. The Inference of Guilt Theory. The "inference of guilt"
theory posits that searches and seizures of people who appear to
be "guilty" will be ranked less intrusively than searches and sei-
zures of "innocent" people. The Focus Scenario that may best
illustrate this theory is the arrest item (6). Forgetting for a mo-
ment how this scenario is ranked between conditions, note its
counterintuitive place in the overall rankings. In particular, note
that, according to our subjects, a public arrest involving
1993]
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handcuffing and a forty-eight hour detention (R = 28) is rated as
less intrusive than a stop for ten minutes (R = 36). This compari-
son not only cuts against the Court's cases,11 4 but also seems to
run counter to "conventional wisdom."
The inference of guilt theory may provide a simple explana-
tion for this result. The arrest scenario is the only scenario, of the
entire fifty, involving a clear police decision that the person in-
volved is guilty; in contrast, the other forty-nine scenarios involve
either a search to determine if the person is guilty or an "explor-
atory" seizure short of an arrest. Thus, the strong inference of
guilt implicit within the arrest scenario may have outweighed our
survey's admonition to assume the innocence of the target, which
in turn may have influenced the perception of intrusiveness. Sup-
porting this assertion is the fact that the one significant exception
to the arrest scenario's relatively low ranking comes under the
First Person condition, where the subject is posited as the person
being arrested, and the assumption of innocence is likely to be
maintained.
Many of the significant differences between the No and Yes
Evidence conditions in the Focus Scenarios might also demonstrate
the inference of guilt theory. In particular, note the findings in
Focus Scenarios 1, 4, and 9, which produced the largest margins
between the No and Yes Evidence conditions in a direction oppo-
site from that hypothesized: that is, the Yes Evidence condition
was ranked as significantly more intrusive in these scenarios than
in any other. Interestingly, whereas most of the scenarios in our
study involved searches for drugs, weapons, and other obvious
evidence of criminal activity, these scenarios were three of only
four, in the entire set of fifty, posing an "objective" that was not
clearly related to investigation of wrongdoing: Focus Scenarios 1
and 9 involved police actions to determine "destination" and Focus
Scenario 4 involved a search for a "picture." Perhaps the subjects
exposed to these scenarios in the Yes Evidence condition ranked
them as more intrusive because they believed the targets were
innocent, and that the police accordingly had no business engaging
in such actions.1
114. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) ("An arrest is a wholly different kind of
intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons. .... ).
115. Findings with respect to the fourth and final scenario involving "innocent" behav-
ior-use of binoculars to see who is in the front yard of a house-may contradict this
[Vol. 42:727
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2. The Dangerousness Theory. A related possible explana-
tion for many of the variations within the Focus Scenarios is that
the subjects allowed their attitudes toward the types of crime be-
ing investigated to affect their answers under the Yes Evidence
condition. Under this theory, if the subject believes the suspected
activity in the Yes Evidence condition is particularly dangerous,
the investigative method used to detect it will be rated as relative-
ly unintrusive. If, on the other hand, the activity being investigated
seems relatively innocuous, the intrusiveness rating will be propor-
tionately higher. This theory may provide an alternative explana-
tion for why the differential found in Focus Scenarios 1, 4, and 9
(which, as just discussed, did not seem to involve investigations of
harmful activity) diverged from our original prediction on the
effect of the No and Yes Evidence conditions. The theory may
also enhance understanding of the Focus Scenarios that do vary in
the direction we originally predicted with respect to these condi-
tions. For instance, three of the four Focus Scenarios with the
biggest differentials in this respect involved investigations of crimes
which arguably were among the most fear-producing in the study:
Focus Scenarios 7 and 8 (the only two scenarios involving orga-
nized crime), and Focus Scenario 3 (the only scenario involving a
terrorist threat)., 6
The "dangerousness" theory might also explain the "semi-sig-
nificant" differential (of eight ranking places) between the Evi-
dence conditions in Focus Scenario 5, despite the fact that the Yes
Evidence condition there clearly involved evidence of crime-that
is, drugs-and is ranked higher than the No Evidence condition.
To see why, it is helpful to examine the rest of the scenarios in-
volving drug-related crime. Looking at Table 3 again, note that
when the evidence sought is "drugs" or drug-related, the variance
between the Yes and No Evidence conditions does not move con-
sistently in one direction; sometimes the Yes Evidence condition is
ranked more highly than the No Evidence condition, and some-
times the reverse is true. But a pattern is perhaps discernible.
reasoning (if a difference of six is considered "significant") since its No Evidence ranking
was 35, but its Yes Evidence ranking was 29.
116. The fourth scenario in this category, Focus Scenario 2 (involving search of a coal
mine for "safety violations"), is probably better explained through the "implied consent"
theory, discussed infra text accompanying notes 118-20.
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When the drugs are sought under circumstances which could sug-
gest private use (see R = 3, 10, 12, 21, 23, 26, 32, 37, 40, 43, 44,
46, 50), the intrusiveness of the police action is ranked either
virtually the same or, as in Focus Scenario 5, much higher in the
Yes Evidence condition. On the other hand, when the drugs are
sought from a drug dealer or under circumstances connoting orga-
nized crime (see R = 18, 35), just the opposite result occurs. This
pattern fits the dangerousness theory, if one assumes that the
subjects do not view private drug use as particularly threatening,
but react strongly to drug dealing. 7
3. The Implied Consent Theory. A final theory which may
have some explanatory value focuses not on who or what is being
investigated, but on the target's perception of the motivation for
the search or seizure. As described by Professor Slobogin:
[A] frisk for a gun is normally equally intrusive whether its pur-
pose is to gather evidence of a felony or a misdemeanor. But
suppose that the frisk for the gun is conducted at an airport in
an effort to detect and deter hijackings or bombings by terrorists.
If the people subject to the frisk are aware that its purpose is to
prevent the possibility of harm to their person, and that it is the
only feasible way of avoiding that harm, they may feel genuinely
grateful for the government intervention., Their sense of intrusion,
harassment, or stigmatization might be significantly reduced given
their awareness of the danger confronting them and of the few
options available to avert that danger.
118
Put in different terms, when the motivation of the searchers seems
beneficent, the sense of intrusion is lessened."1
The "implied consent" theory described above most obviously
helps to explain the low Yes Evidence intrusiveness rating in Fo-
cus Scenario 3, which posed a pat-down in the No Evidence condi-
tion, but an airport pat-down after a terrorist threat in the Yes
Evidence condition. It also may provide an alternative explanation
for the higher Yes Evidence and lower First Person rankings in
117. The only major exception to this rule is the scenario involving a search of a
sixth-grader's locker for drugs (R = 25); there, the Yes Condition is ranked four levels
below the No Condition, a differentiation which, assuming it is 'significant, can easily be
explained in terms of the dangerousness theory, given the age of the private user.
118. Slobogin, supra note 103, at 62-63.
119. See Small, supra note 63, at 64 (finding that "[ratings of the offensiveness of
intrusive activities are significantly shaped by the stated motive of the intruder").
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Focus Scenario 5 (counter to both Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis
3). Note that this scenario changed from "rummaging through a
suitcase in an airport" in the No Evidence condition-a search a
person might easily conjecture was for weapons-to "rummaging
through a suitcase in an airport for drugs" in the Yes Evidence
condition. If the implied consent theory is correct in predicting
that a normally intrusive search will seem less so when it promotes
self-protection, the finding that the First Person and No Evidence
conditions in this scenario were ranked less intrusively than their
counterparts is not surprising.
Finally, the implied consent theory may explain the larger
than average differential between the Evidence conditions in Focus
Scenario 2, which involved a search of a coal mine in the No
Evidence condition and a search of a coal mine for evidence of
safety violations in the Yes Evidence condition. As Professor
Slobogin puts it:
When the purpose of the government action is to punish or
shame (as with searches for infractions of school disciplinary
rules), it is likely to be seen as intrusive even if it does not result
in criminal prosecution. But if the object is to facilitate and aid
(as in fire, safety, and health inspections), then the typical reac-
tion may be different. As in the airport frisk scenario presented
earlier, people subjected to such inspections may be grateful for
the intrusion even if nothing is discovered .... "
Thus, the fact that the coal mine scenario received its lowest rat-
ing from subjects who were told it involved a search for safety
violations is not surprising. The implied consent theory may also
help explain the low rankings, overall, of inspections of restaurant
kitchens (R = 7) and residential plumbing and wiring (R = 11).
4. Implications of the Theories. At this stage, of course, all
of the theories proffered above are speculation. The condition
rankings in Table 3 suffer from the same external validity flaws
that afflict the overall rankings in Table 1, with the added problem
that the sample for each condition is smaller than the overall
sample. Furthermore, because the scenarios were meant to mimic
actual cases, they were not constructed to test the theories out-
lined above (which we developed only after we obtained the re-
120. Slobogin, supra note 103, at 95 (footnote omitted).
7691993]
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suits). Thus, the type of evidence sought and the types of crimes
involved were varied too idiosyncratically to establish clear conclu-
sions about their validity.
It must also be recognized, of course, that the three theories
advanced here, even if valid, do not exhaust all the possible ways
in which people view intrusiveness. In addition to the four condi-
tions used here (First and Third Person, No and Yes Evidence),
there may be many other variables that affect perceptions of priva-
cy and autonomy, such as the behavior of the police, the time of
day and the thoroughness of the search,"' and the nature of the
evidence sought from a particular place," none of which were
consistently integrated into our survey.
With these caveats, a few observations about the implications
of these theories can be made. Most troublesome are the implica-
tions of the inference of guilt and dangerousness theories. As
noted earlier, the Court has held that intrusiveness under the
Fourth Amendment should be considered from the viewpoint of
an innocent person." And, purely as a matter of logic, it would
seem that to the extent an intrusiveness rating is based on as-
sumed guilt of the particular target or repugnance toward the
criminal activity investigated, it should be invalid for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Thus, for instance, the mere fact that the
police have decided a person is subject to arrest, or are investigat-
ing organized crime rather than some lesser crime, should not
normally affect measurement of the action's insult to privacy or
autonomy. Similarly, the mere fact that the police do not appear
to be after wrongdoing (but are merely asking, say, about destina-
tion) should not elevate the level of intrusiveness above what it
would be if the police's objective were unknown.
The issue to which the relative "guilt" of the target is more
obviously relevant is whether, once the intrusiveness of an investi-
gative action has been established, the police may undertake it.
121. See Bradley, supra note 108, at 1491.
122. Imagine, for instance, a search of "open fields" for marijuana, versus a search of
"open fields" for a 'conversation. The latter is likely to be seen as more intrusive. See
generally Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" An
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1100-07 (1987) (arguing that the
location, whether there is physical intrusion into it, and the object of the search are all
variables given significance in the Court's cases). This study was not constructed to test
these variables in a systematic way.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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For instance, if the police stop a person and ask open-ended ques-
tions about destination for ten minutes, it is likely that they lacked
concrete suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.
If so, the stop should not have occurred in the first place. By the
same token, the high degree of intrusion associated with an arrest
is nonetheless permissible if the police have significant reason to
believe the person has committed a crime. Less persuasively, one
might argue that the nature of the suspected crime should also
affect how much suspicion the police need before they may act
(for example, our fear of organized crime might allow the police
to investigate on less than normal justification)."
In any event, the intrusiveness issue and the issue of whether
there is sufficient suspicion to authorize a given intrusion should
not be conflated. Yet the subjects in our study may have done so,
either unconsciously or consciously, in reaction to the target's
assumed guilt or suspected crime. Whether the same biasing pro-
cess occurs in the courts is an important question. The typical
Fourth Amendment case involves a clearly guilty person, often
charged with a serious crime, whose only argument at a pretrial
suppression hearing or on appeal is that the evidence against him
was illegally seized. Analysis of the Focus Scenarios strongly sup-
ports Hypothesis 3's conjecture that judges are more likely to dis-
count assertions of expectations of privacy and restraints on liberty
under these circumstances than if the person were clearly inno-
cent.' 25
The third theory of intrusiveness supported by this study-the
implied consent theory-is more compatible with the rationale of
the Fourth Amendment than are the inference of guilt and danger-
ousness theories, because it focuses on the reaction of the target,
not the observer. If the person investigated feels that the purpose
124. However, one of us has argued that, except in rare instances, where a specific
threat of future danger is involved, dangerousness should not permit reduction in the cer-
tainty level. See Slobogin, supra note 103, at 55-464.
125. Other empirical evidence suggests that juries act in a similar manner. See Jona
than D. Casper et al., The Tort Remedy in Search and Seizure Cases: A Case Study in
Juror Decision Making, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 279, 299 (1988) (suggesting that plain-
tiffs in civil suits against officers receive less favorable verdicts from juries who know
that evidence was found during the search); see also Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at
What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule:
The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, AM. B. FOUND. RES. . 611, 685 &
n.436 (1983); William . Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
REV. 881, 911-13 (1991).
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of a search or a seizure (such as the airport frisk in response to a
terrorist threat) is beneficent, the sense of intrusion is likely to be
diminished, if not eliminated.1 6 Accordingly, this theory may be
a useful one for courts to consider in evaluating intrusiveness. Al-
though it seems to have considered this theory in at least one
case," the Supreme Court has never endorsed this approach.
C. Results re Hypothesis 4: The Effect of Attitudes Toward the
Criminal Justice System
The final factor focused on in this study is the relationship be-
tween attitudes toward the criminal justice system and intrusive-
ness. The data revealed a significant relationship between due
process attitudes and perceptions of intrusiveness;" that is, the
more due process-oriented the subject, the more likely the search
and seizure scenarios are to be perceived as intrusive. This finding
conforms with our prediction that those most interested in pro-
tecting the rights of criminal defendants would also be most con-
cerned about privacy and autonomy.
On the other hand, contrary to our hypothesis, perceptions of
intrusiveness and crime control attitudes were not significantly re-
lated." ' Apparently, those who consider the primary goal of the
126. Such a theory may also allow routine drug and alcohol checks of all people who
fly planes or engineer trains.
127. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court justified residential
inspections for safety and health violations in part on the ground that "such programs
have a long history of judicial and public acceptance." Id. at 537.
128. r = .44, p < .001. The designation r stands for a Person Product Moment Corre-
lation (or statistical relation) between two variables (here, perception of intrusiveness and
due process attitudes). An r score of 1.0 means a perfect correlation. However, an r of
over .4 is considered relatively high. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 75 (2d ed. 1990). Thus, a correlation of r =
.44 suggests that persons who have high scores on the due process scale (i.e., due pro-
cess-oriented persons) are also likely to give high scores on the intrusiveness scale, and
vice versa (i.e., people who scored low on the due process scale are likely to score the
scenarios less intrusively). The probability that this relation is due to chance is 1 out of
1,000 (p < .001). In general, the higher the correlation, the stronger the relation.
129. r = .10 (see supra note 128 for an explanation of this figure). One might ques-
tion this finding on the ground that, if due process attitudes and intrusiveness ratings are
directly related, then crime control attitudes and intrusiveness ratings must be inversely
related. This conclusion would be correct if one assumes that due process and crime
control attitudes are the opposite ends of the same construct. However, in a previously
conducted factor analysis of the instrument we used in this study (the Attitudes Toward
Crime Control Scales), it was discovered that those items that described a crime control
position were often endorsed strongly by people who also endorsed strongly an item
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criminal justice system to be convicting the guilty are not neces-
sarily willing to disregard privacy interests to achieve this objec-
tive. When one considers the role of the Fourth Amendment in
our society, this finding is not as counterintuitive as it might first
appear. Many other criminal process rights, such as the right to
remain silent,1" the right to counsel during interrogation, 13 1 and
the requirement that conviction at trial be based on proof beyond
a reasonable doubt'32 often have the effect of helping people
who are guilty to elude conviction. In contrast, the warrant and
suspicion requirements, as flimsy as they are under current Su-
preme Court jurisprudence, still act to prevent police from random
invasions of privacy, a prohibition that inures to the benefit of all
citizens. To a much greater extent than the other rights mentioned,
the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures tends to
protect innocent people from governmental abuse.
The finding that there is no correlation between crime control
attitudes and perceptions of intrusiveness does not necessarily
mean that a similar result would be found among "crime control"
judges, however. That is because a judge, unlike the subjects in
our study, must sanction a violation of the Fourth Amendment
once she has found it to apply; that sanction is usually exclusion
of the illegally obtained evidence and the release of a clearly
guilty person. 33 Thus, even if a crime control judge is as sensi-
tive to privacy and autonomy concerns as a due process judge, her
describing a due process position; it was further discovered that only a modest negative
correlation existed between the two sets of items (r = -.33), and that greater internal
consistency was obtained when answers to crime control and due process items were
scored separately. Thus, there appears to be a subset of persons who support both due
process and crime control attitudes. Professor Schumacher concluded from this data that
crime control and due process attitudes are separate constructs with high and low levels
of each within each person, and they should be measured as such. Schumacher, supra
note 38. The results of this study lend support to the view that due process and crime
control attitudes can coexist.
130. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (all those subject to custodial
interrogation are entitled to be told they have a right to remain silent during interro-
gation); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutor may not comment on
defendant's failure to take the stand at trial); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
486 (1951) (a witness may refuse to "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute").
131. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436 (all those subject to custodial interrogation are entitled
to be told they have a right to counsel during interrogation).
132. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
133. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1993
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evaluation of those concerns could easily be influenced by the
"due process" remedy that awaits those who prevail on a Fourth
Amendment claim.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Although its wording merely regulates police attempts to
obtain physical evidence, the Fourth Amendment's importance
extends far beyond that objective. As Professor Paulsen has noted:
The basic... problem of a free society is the problem of
controlling the public monopoly of force. All the other freedoms,
freedom of speech, of assembly, of 'religion, of political action,
presuppose that arbitrary and capricious police action has been
restrained. Security in one's home and person is the fundamental
without which there can be no liberty.
135
The Supreme Court's conclusions concerning the threshold of the
Fourth Amendment and the extent of its protections have a signif-
icant impact on the nature of our society.
For good reason, then, the Court has stated that community
values about intrusiveness should heavily influence, if not dictate,
when a police investigative action infringes on "reasonable expec-
tations of privacy" or produces "reasonable feelings of restraint."
The results and explanations set forth above provide some initial
evidence about those values. To the extent findings like these are
replicated through methodologically sound research, they would
suggest that the Supreme Court's conclusions about the scope of
the Fourth Amendment are often not in tune with commonly held
attitudes about police investigative techniques.
Assuming so, the Court has four options, the first two of
which would not necessitate a change in the results of its search
and seizure cases, the latter two of which would. The alternative
most likely to be adopted, given the Court's past reaction to em-
pirical research, is to reject or ignore the data. Second, the Court
could render the data irrelevant, either by redefining the expecta-
tion-of-privacy and restraint-on-freedom concepts independently of
134. Of course, further research is need to test this hypothesis about judges. See gen-
erally John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L REV. 1027 (1974)
(arguing that exclusionary rule exacts too great a cost on society).
135. Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962).
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societal understandings, or by deciding that intrusiveness is not as
important to search and seizure analysis as it currently is thought
to be. Third, the Court could keep its current analytical structure,
but admit that its conclusions about society's expectations of priva-
cy and autonomy are wrong. Finally, it could entirely restructure
Fourth Amendment analysis so that, in contrast to the second
option, it is more, rather than less, dependent upon the societal
values reflected in our data.136
The results of this research should also remind judges that
because of their distance from the world of police investigation
and the effect of hindsight bias, they may tend to underestimate
the intrusiveness of police actions, at least if community values
remain the linchpin of search and seizure jirisprudence. Of course,
one of the most effective ways of countering these biasing effects
is to consult the type of data reported in this Article. If that meth-
od is rejected, judges will have to rely on self-knowledge and
sensitive assessments of the facts to ensure that their assessments
of expectations of privacy and autonomy reflect realistic societal
attitudes rather than their own.
136. As mentioned herein, such a specific reform has been previously suggested by
Professor Slobogin. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
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